44 published Court of Appeals opinions in which a summary-judgment ruling in a premises-liability case was decided, filed October 1, 2023 through September 30, 2026. Each opinion was read and the ground the court actually relied on was recorded, so the reasons can be counted rather than asserted. Every case is named and linked to the opinion.
The landowner moved for summary judgment in 42 of 44 appeals, so a plaintiff-favorable result here almost always means a grant of summary judgment was reversed — the plaintiff surviving the motion, not winning at trial.
Opinions are counted once per theme when any of that theme's grounds was relied on; a case can appear on both sides of the chart if the appeal cut both ways.
Each opinion is read twice: for the ground the court actually rested its ruling on (the dark part of the bar) and for every other ground the same opinion also endorses (the light part). Georgia courts often give two or three reasons, so the light bar is longer than the dark one — and the light number is the safer count to quote.
the ground the court relied on other grounds the opinion also endorses
the ground the court relied on other grounds the opinion also endorses
| Filed | Case | Result | Favored | Ground relied on |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-16 | Kristina Holston v. Aboebarensi Inc. | affirmed | defendant | No superior knowledge (plaintiff knew) |
| 2026-08-24 | Tamia Richardson v. Thunder LLC | affirmed | defendant | Third-party act not foreseeable |
| 2026-07-01 | Betty Morano v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP | reversed | plaintiff | Conflicting evidence on knowledge |
| 2026-06-24 | Daniel Cook v. SMG Construction Services, LLC | reversed | plaintiff | The movant's own showing insufficient |
| 2026-03-26 | Monnie Loveless v. GSH Investments, LLC | reversed in part | plaintiff | Evidence raised a jury question on notice |
| 2026-03-16 | American Tire Distributors, Inc. v. Ian Broadnax | reversed | defendant | Procedural ground (spoliation, discovery) |
| 2026-02-10 | Radheshvar, LLC v. Kenneth A. Perez Larios | affirmed | plaintiff | A duty existed that the court ignored |
| 2026-02-06 | James Giles v. Greenhouse Apartments LLC | affirmed | defendant | No or speculative causation |
| 2026-01-27 | Daniella Mejia v. SK Battery America Inc. | affirmed | defendant | Plaintiff's own negligence |
| 2025-12-03 | Peachstate Concessionaires Inc. v. Mekiah Bryant | reversed | defendant | Statutory bar / immunity / release |
| 2025-11-19 | Tara Wells v. Khan Shell, LLC | affirmed | defendant | Hazard open and obvious as a matter of law |
| 2025-10-17 | Bobby Ray Stevens v. John Welch JR. | affirmed | defendant | No superior knowledge (plaintiff knew) |
| 2025-09-16 | Terry Miller v. Dolgencorp, LLC | affirmed | defendant | No superior knowledge (plaintiff knew) |
| 2025-09-12 | Mekedelawit Hailu v. John Milledge Academy, Inc. | reversed | plaintiff | Open-and-obvious was not dispositive |
| 2025-08-15 | The Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Savannah v. Gloria McLamb | reversed | defendant | Statutory bar / immunity / release |
| 2025-07-02 | Tuscany Condominium Association Inc. v. C.p An Adult Female | affirmed | plaintiff | Contractual or statutory bar rejected |
| 2025-06-03 | The City of Vidalia v. Amy Wade Johnson | reversed | defendant | No constructive notice of the hazard |
| 2025-03-03 | Laurie Murphy v. Janilink Corp. | affirmed | defendant | No superior knowledge (plaintiff knew) |
| 2025-02-04 | Erin Drossman v. Wal-mart Stores East LP, (delaware) | affirmed | defendant | No superior knowledge (plaintiff knew) |
| 2025-01-13 | All American Quality Foods, Inc. v. Bernice Britten | reversed | defendant | No or speculative causation |
| 2024-12-23 | Kwabena Shedeke v. Patricia Garrett | affirmed | defendant | No duty owed |
| 2024-10-29 | First Communities Management Inc. v. Tearria Byrd As Administrator Of The Estate Of Shamecia Byrd | affirmed | plaintiff | Contractual or statutory bar rejected |
| 2024-10-28 | Curtis T. Jones v. Scarlett & Associates Inc. | affirmed | defendant | No superior knowledge (plaintiff knew) |
| 2024-09-17 | Martha Adams v. Jason Lee | reversed | plaintiff | A duty existed that the court ignored |
| 2024-08-08 | Kenneth W. Kidd v. Metro Brokers Inc. | affirmed | defendant | No duty owed |
| 2024-07-02 | Christina Guy v. the Housing Authority of the City of Augusta | affirmed | defendant | Statutory bar / immunity / release |
| 2024-06-27 | American Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Marie Gillis | reversed | defendant | Hazard open and obvious as a matter of law |
| 2024-06-24 | High West, LLC v. Michelle Reese | reversed | defendant | No duty owed |
| 2024-06-18 | Margie Pollard v. Greg Deloach | reversed | plaintiff | Evidence raised a jury question on notice |
| 2024-05-29 | Teri Meadows v. Dollar General Store | affirmed | defendant | No superior knowledge (plaintiff knew) |
| 2024-05-20 | Tactical Security Group LLC v. Cynthia Welch | affirmed | plaintiff | A duty existed that the court ignored |
| 2024-03-27 | Ceileth Drucker v. Jonathan H. Morgan | affirmed in part | mixed | A duty existed that the court ignored |
| 2024-03-12 | Marquita Jordan As Personal Representative Of Sincere Jordan v. H. J. Russell & Company | reversed in part | defendant | No duty owed |
| 2024-03-06 | Lynda Soundara v. S.a.f.e Management of Georgia, LLC | affirmed | defendant | Plaintiff's own negligence |
| 2024-03-01 | Mattie L. Smith v. Six Flags Over Georgia II, LP | affirmed | defendant | No or speculative causation |
| 2024-02-22 | Damario Williams v. Kasulka Properties LP | affirmed | defendant | No duty owed |
| 2024-01-16 | Brixmor New Chastain Corners Sc, LLC v. Arlene James | affirmed in part | plaintiff | Conflicting evidence on knowledge |
| 2023-11-17 | Savannah State University Foundation Inc. v. Konshitera Lewis | reversed | defendant | No duty owed |
| 2023-11-03 | Patti Pennington v. Bridge Senior Living LLC | affirmed | defendant | Hazard open and obvious as a matter of law |
| 2023-11-01 | Angela Knight, as Parent and or Guardian of Khalan Knight, a Minor v. Senoia Raceway Management, Inc. | affirmed | defendant | Plaintiff's own negligence |
| 2023-10-31 | Suresh & Durga, Inc. v. Jane Doe | affirmed in part | plaintiff | Prior similar acts made crime foreseeable |
| 2023-10-30 | Arian Chamea Berrian v. Max Grin, LLC | affirmed | defendant | No or speculative causation |
| 2023-10-23 | Terri Fields As Next Friend Of Ronquisha Farley v. Rainbow Community Center Inc. | reversed in part | plaintiff | Prior similar acts made crime foreseeable |
| 2023-10-02 | D. L. v. St. Francis Health, LLC | reversed | plaintiff | Prior similar acts made crime foreseeable |
Each ground is defined in plain terms, then illustrated with one case from the survey, cited by name, docket and date. The count is how many opinions in the set rest on that ground — the full list of cases, each linked to the opinion, is in the table above.
The owner owed no duty at all. In Georgia that usually turns on the injured person's legal status on the property (licensee, trespasser, or public-safety officer under the fireman's rule), or on the owner having no possession or control of the area where the injury happened.
Example Kwabena Shedeke v. Patricia Garrett, No. A24A1303 (filed Dec. 23, 2024)
Under the fireman's rule, Officer Shedeke entered the property in his professional capacity and was therefore a licensee, not an invitee, so Garrett owed only the lesser duty to avoid willful or wanton injury. The undisputed evidence showed Garrett did not act willfully or wantonly, so summary judgment for the homeowner was affirmed.
“the uncontroverted evidence shows that Shedeke was present on Garrett's property in his professional capacity, responding to a call about a hole in Garrett's porch, and he was injured when he fell into that same hole. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that Shedeke occupied the status of a licensee as a matter of law.”
No superior knowledge. Georgia requires proof that the owner knew or should have known of the hazard and the injured person did not; the owner wins if the plaintiff already knew of it, or if the owner had no reason to know.
Example Kristina Holston v. Aboebarensi Inc., No. A26A1219 (filed Sept. 16, 2026)
The court held the defendants were entitled to summary judgment because Holston had actual knowledge of the air hose equal to the owner's knowledge, so the owner lacked superior knowledge of the hazard. The court also affirmed the denial of spoliation sanctions because the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
“Holston's undisputed deposition testimony that she saw the air hose before tripping over it establishes that she was actually aware of that hazard.”
The hazard was open and obvious as a matter of law. A static, plainly visible condition with nothing to distract the plaintiff puts the plaintiff on equal footing with the owner, and no duty to warn arises.
Example Tara Wells v. Khan Shell, LLC, No. A25A2101 (filed Nov. 19, 2025)
The court held that the uneven pavement was a static condition that was open and obvious, and because nothing obstructed Wells's view and she simply was not looking, her knowledge of the hazard was equal to the owner's, barring recovery.
“The evidence establishes that the imperfections in the Khan Shell parking lot were open and obvious. Under these circumstances, Wells is deemed to have had equal knowledge of the alleged hazard, and she cannot recover for injuries caused by it.”
No constructive notice. The plaintiff could not show how long the hazard had existed, and without evidence of duration a jury cannot infer the owner had time to find and fix it.
Example The City of Vidalia v. Amy Wade Johnson, No. A25A0586 (filed June 3, 2025)
The court held the City lacked constructive notice because the only evidence of the defect's duration was photographs taken months after the fall, which without context were mere speculation; the nuisance claim also failed as a matter of law for lack of evidence of more than mere negligence.
“Johnson's claim fails due to her inability to proffer any evidence that would raise a question of fact as to the City's constructive notice, and the City was entitled to summary judgment on the negligence claim.”
The owner's conduct met the standard of ordinary care as a matter of law — inspection and cleaning routines were reasonable, or the owner did what a reasonable owner would do.
Example Kwabena Shedeke v. Patricia Garrett, No. A24A1303 (filed Dec. 23, 2024)
Under the fireman's rule, Officer Shedeke entered the property in his professional capacity and was therefore a licensee, not an invitee, so Garrett owed only the lesser duty to avoid willful or wanton injury. The undisputed evidence showed Garrett did not act willfully or wantonly, so summary judgment for the homeowner was affirmed.
“the uncontroverted evidence shows that Shedeke was present on Garrett's property in his professional capacity, responding to a call about a hole in Garrett's porch, and he was injured when he fell into that same hole. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that Shedeke occupied the status of a licensee as a matter of law.”
No proof that the hazard caused the injury, or the causal link was left to speculation; Georgia requires evidence from which a jury could find cause in fact without guessing.
Example James Giles v. Greenhouse Apartments LLC, No. A25A2143 (filed Feb. 6, 2026)
The court affirmed summary judgment for the landowner because Giles failed to establish the causation element of his premises-liability claim, offering only speculation that enhanced security measures would have prevented the attack. His causation argument was also unsupported by record citations, so the court declined to cull the record on his behalf.
“Giles has failed, then, to detail any specific security measures Greenhouse could have taken that would have—more likely than not—prevented his assault in September 2020. As a result, given the summary nature of Giles's argument about causation, he has failed to show how a jury would not be left to speculate as to whether any security measures taken by Greenhouse could have prevented the attack—which is impermissible.”
A third party's act — often a crime — was not foreseeable, so the owner had no duty to guard against it. Georgia looks for prior similar acts on or near the premises.
Example Tamia Richardson v. Thunder LLC, No. A26A1519 (filed Aug. 24, 2026)
The court held the random shooting at the fraternity block party was not reasonably foreseeable because there was no evidence of prior similar violent incidents, so the landowner owed no duty to guard against the third-party criminal act and summary judgment was affirmed.
“we conclude that the plaintiffs failed to come forward with evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the shooting incident was reasonably foreseeable to Thunder. Consequently, Thunder owed no duty as owner of the Property to protect the plaintiffs from that unanticipated criminal act”
The supporting record was legally insufficient to create a jury question — an affidavit lacking personal knowledge, an assertion with no record cite, or inadmissible expert testimony.
Example American Tire Distributors, Inc. v. Ian Broadnax, No. A25A1987 (filed Mar. 16, 2026)
The majority held the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to let the defendant withdraw its statutory admissions under OCGA § 9-11-36 (b), so the partial summary judgment built on those admissions was itself error — the defense won on the admission/discovery ground.
“Having determined that the trial court abused its discretion in denying ATD's motion to withdraw admissions, we conclude that the partial summary judgment based on these admissions was also error.”
A statute, immunity, release, or notice requirement ended the case: governmental or charitable immunity, the Recreational Property Act, an exculpatory clause, or a failure to give ante-litem notice.
Example Peachstate Concessionaires Inc. v. Mekiah Bryant, No. A25A1922 (filed Dec. 3, 2025)
The court held that Bryant's stabbing by a disgruntled customer arose out of and in the course of her employment, so her premises-liability claims were barred by the Workers' Compensation Act's exclusive remedy provision, and the trial court's partial denial of summary judgment was reversed.
“Accordingly, Bryant's claims against Peachstate are barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Act. Therefore, the trial court's denial of Peachstate's motion for summary judgment with regard to Bryant's premises liability claim must be reversed, and, on remand, the trial court is directed to enter summary judgment in Peachstate's favor.”
The plaintiff's own negligence, assumption of the risk, or failure to exercise ordinary care barred or defeated recovery as a matter of law.
Example Daniella Mejia v. SK Battery America Inc., No. A25A2164 (filed Jan. 27, 2026)
The court affirmed summary judgment because Bell assumed the risk of his injuries: he had specific knowledge of the non-weight-bearing louvers, appreciated the danger of falling (having witnessed a coworker's fall and identifying the hazard himself), and voluntarily exposed himself to it by going above the ceiling and refusing to tie off despite warnings.
“Bell 'with a full appreciation of the danger involved and without restriction of [his] freedom of choice either by the circumstances or by coercion, deliberately cho[se] an obviously perilous course of conduct.'”
The appeal turned on procedure rather than the merits of the premises claim — deemed admissions, a discovery dispute, or spoliation.
Example American Tire Distributors, Inc. v. Ian Broadnax, No. A25A1987 (filed Mar. 16, 2026)
The majority held the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to let the defendant withdraw its statutory admissions under OCGA § 9-11-36 (b), so the partial summary judgment built on those admissions was itself error — the defense won on the admission/discovery ground.
“Having determined that the trial court abused its discretion in denying ATD's motion to withdraw admissions, we conclude that the partial summary judgment based on these admissions was also error.”
There was evidence of how long the hazard existed — video, prior complaints, or inspection records — so a jury could find the owner had constructive notice.
Example Monnie Loveless v. GSH Investments, LLC, No. A26A0113 (filed Mar. 26, 2026)
The court held that evidence of visible water damage and wood rot on the stairs, combined with GSH's receipt of appraisal and survey reports flagging deferred maintenance and its failure to establish any inspection procedure, raised a jury question on constructive knowledge, so summary judgment for the landowner was reversed.
“a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether GSH had constructive knowledge of the hazard posed by the staircase, and the trial court erred in concluding otherwise”
Conflicting evidence about who knew what left a genuine dispute over the owner's superior knowledge, so summary judgment was improper.
Example Betty Morano v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, No. A26A0191 (filed July 1, 2026)
The court held that the record, including the surveillance video, did not contain plain, palpable, and undisputed evidence that Morano intentionally and unreasonably exposed herself to the hazard after learning of it, so the question of equal or superior knowledge was for the jury. Wal-Mart's own showing failed to negate the plaintiff's lack of knowledge prong.
“Because there exists a genuine issue of material fact on whether Morano had equal or superior knowledge of the hazard, Wal-Mart has not shown that it is entitled to summary judgment.”
Open and obvious was not the end of it — the distraction exception or a duty to warn kept the claim alive, or the plaintiff's equal knowledge was itself disputed.
Example Mekedelawit Hailu v. John Milledge Academy, Inc., No. A25A1130 (filed Sept. 12, 2025)
The court held that the open-and-obvious/equal-knowledge defense did not dispose of the case because the unmarked, elevated asphalt feature was a static condition the plaintiff had not previously traversed, so a jury question remained on JMA's superior knowledge and duty to warn.
“the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to JMA. See id. (affirming the trial court's denial of summary judgment to the defendant when the evidence showed that the plaintiff tripped over an unmarked, elevated static condition and had not traversed the area prior)”
A duty existed that the grant of summary judgment ignored — the plaintiff was an invitee, the owner kept possession or control, or the owner voluntarily undertook to keep the premises safe.
Example Radheshvar, LLC v. Kenneth A. Perez Larios, No. A25A1723 (filed Feb. 10, 2026)
The court held that a jury could find Perez Larios was an invitee (not merely a licensee) because he was a social guest of a paying motel customer, so the landowner owed ordinary care and its summary-judgment burden was not met.
“the evidence that Perez Larios was visiting a paying motel guest when he was attacked is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was an invitee.”
The plaintiff put in enough evidence of causation to reach a jury, so summary judgment on that ground was reversed.
Example Tactical Security Group LLC v. Cynthia Welch, No. A21A1342 (filed May 20, 2024)
The Supreme Court held a security company may owe a tort duty under Restatement § 324A informed by its contract, and the Court of Appeals found jury questions on whether Tactical completely undertook Pappas's security duty, whether Pappas or Welch relied on Tactical, and whether the failure to patrol caused the harm. The denial of summary judgment was therefore affirmed.
“Having concluded that these preliminary questions regarding the application of Section 324A are questions for the jury, we consider whether Welch can meet one of the three subsections in Section 324A because, if she cannot, summary judgment in Tactical's favor would be proper.”
Prior similar acts on or near the property made a third party's criminal act foreseeable, which creates a duty to take reasonable precautions.
Example Suresh & Durga, Inc. v. Jane Doe, No. A23A0942 (filed Oct. 31, 2023)
The court held that evidence of prior criminal activity and the motel's failure to follow its own security measures raised a jury question on whether the third-party crime against Doe was foreseeable and whether that failure caused her injuries, so the denial of summary judgment on the premises-liability claim was affirmed.
“Given the standard at the summary judgment stage and the evidence in the extensive record before us, we agree with the trial court that Doe raised a triable issue of fact regarding a possible causal connection between Defendant's failure to implement and follow security measures and Doe's injuries.”
The movant's own showing was defective — a self-serving affidavit, an unsupported assertion, or no citation to record evidence — so the motion could not be granted.
Example Daniel Cook v. SMG Construction Services, LLC, No. A24A0886 (filed June 24, 2026)
The Supreme Court held Cook had actual knowledge of the ledge as a matter of law, but the Court of Appeals found genuine issues of material fact remained on the other elements of SMG's affirmative defenses (assumption of the risk and voluntary negligence), so SMG failed to carry its summary-judgment burden and the grant was reversed.
“Finding that genuine issues of material fact do exist as to both of those defenses, we hold that SMG was not entitled to summary judgment and we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment to it.”
The contractual or statutory bar the owner relied on did not apply or was unenforceable — for example, an exculpatory clause that failed under OCGA § 13-8-2 (b).
Example Tuscany Condominium Association Inc. v. C.p An Adult Female, No. A25A0145 (filed July 2, 2025)
The trial court denied TCA's summary judgment motion on the negligent security claim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Declaration's 'no security' provision did not relieve TCA of its duty and that the evidence of prior criminal activity created a jury question on foreseeability.
“THE ASSOCIATION OR THE DECLARANT MAY, BUT SHALL NOT BE REQUIRED TO, FROM TIME TO TIME, PROVIDE MEASURES OR TAKE ACTIONS WHICH DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY IMPROVE SAFETY ON THE CONDOMINIUM”
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Every case named above links to its page in the free public CourtListener case-law archive (courtlistener.com), which hosts the official Georgia Court of Appeals PDFs. This page is research working product, not legal advice.